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Abstract 
In the absence of a clear indication in the Treaties as to what solidarity entails, three visions of 
solidarity have emerged: a supranational/functional, an intergovernmental/voluntary, and an 
individual-focused/constructivist vision. Following X and X v Belgium and the link between 
visa policy and the EU’s questionable strategy of externalisation of international protection, it 
can be concluded that visa policy is characterised by the absence of individual-focused 
solidarity, and does not offer any expression of the central place that human rights protection 
has in the EU’s identity as enshrined in the Treaties. This may be partly reconnected to the 
unclear scope of the fundamental rights protection framework applicable to visas under 
international law. Visa policy tends to be characterised by inter-state and state-centred 
solidarity which takes a supranational form in the field of policy formulation vis-à-vis third 
countries and an intergovernmental form in the field of implementation on the ground. 
Supranational solidarity has not proven to be necessarily effective in overcoming the lack of 
convergence of interests between the Member States in areas which are sovereign sensitive, or 
to be capable of doing so in a way that upholds EU principles. Intergovernmental solidarity in 
the implementation of the policy is functionally driven and progressively characterised by EU 
norms and procedures, but it is unlikely that the search for effectiveness will lead to the 
supranationalisation of this sovereign sensitive field.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Visa policy has been left largely untouched by the refugee and Schengen crises, although it can 
be seen as one of the causes of irregular border crossings by migrants which, by virtue of the 
Dublin III Regulation,2 disproportionately affect frontline Member States and result in a 
significant loss of human life. This isolation has recently been reinforced by the judgement of 
the Court of Justice in X and X v Belgium.3 In that case, the Court established that limited 
territorial validity visas issued by the Member States to third country nationals on humanitarian 
grounds for the purpose of applying for asylum once in the issuing Member State are outside 
the scope of the Visa Code, since the Code covers only visas for intended stays not exceeding 
three months.4 Accordingly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not applicable, and does not 
create any obligations for the Member States in relation to issuing such visas.  
Notwithstanding the EU visa policy’s insulation from the refugee and Schengen crises, 
the issue of solidarity has been long-standing in relation to visa policy too. This article analyses 
solidarity in the context of visa policy. It considers the different forms that solidarity takes 
within the policy, and the links between these forms and the state-centred and security-oriented 
nature of visas.   
Unlike several other contributions in this collection, this contribution favours an 
analytical approach over a normative one, as this allows a broader perspective on the policy 
2 Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), [2013] 
OJ L 180/31 (hereafter Dublin III Regulation). 
3 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium, EC:C:2017:292. 
4 Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), [2009] OJ L 243/1 (hereafter Visa Code). 
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and as a normative approach, in the light of X and X v Belgium,5 may bear little practical 
fruitfulness at this stage. Nevertheless, the article highlights the shortcomings of the various 
forms of solidarity in relation to visa policy in terms of achieving policy effectiveness and 
reflecting the EU’s identity as enshrined in the Treaties.  
 
1. THREE DIFFERENT VISIONS OF SOLIDARITY 
 
In a context where the Treaties envisage an undefined concept of solidarity as the foundation 
of EU immigration policies, three visions of solidarity have emerged which are entangled with 
the issue of EU competence, and the limits of the supranational method.6  
One is a supranational/functional vision of solidarity, according to which solidarity 
must necessarily be part of certain ‘common’ policies if these are to be effective in meeting 
their objectives.7 Solidarity here is seen as an instrument to overcome heterogeneity among the 
Member States in pursuance of a high degree of supranational integration.8 It is part of a 
dynamic that deepens supranational integration and falls within the responsibility of the EU.9  
Solidarity is therefore linked to the issue of effectiveness, and a matter of EU competence. 
Under this vision, solidarity as solely a crisis management tool is discounted in favour of 
systematic responsibility sharing.10  On the other hand, it is doubtful whether solidarity could 
go as far as requiring a shift of responsibility from the Member States to the EU in relation to 
the implementation of common rules, as was partly envisaged by the Commission proposed 
5 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium. 
6 Articles 67(2) and 80 TFEU. On the limits of the supranational method, see D. Thym, ‘The “refugee crisis” as 
a challenge of legal design and institutional legitimacy’, 53 Common Market Law Review (2016), p. 1545-1574.  
7 J. Bast, ‘Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law’, 22 European Public 
Law (2016), p. 289-304, p. 296-297.  
8 Ibid., p. 289. 
9 Ibid., p. 302. 
10 On the choice between prevention and remedial action, see D. Vanhelule, J. van Selm and C. Boswell, The 
Implementation of Article 80 TFEU on the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States in the field of border checks, asylum and immigration, Study 
for the European Parliament PE453.167 (2011). 
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EBCG Agency’s ‘right of initiative’,11  in the light of such Treaty provisions as Articles 72 
TFEU, 4(2) and 5 TEU on the principles of respect for Member States’ responsibilities with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, conferral 
of power, subsidiarity and proportionality.12 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the supranational 
method as it stands could deliver such an integrationist version of solidarity in the absence of 
full political support from the Member States.13 
This supranational vision competes with an intergovernmental/voluntary cooperation 
notion of solidarity which, on its part, is criticised as undermining the very existence of 
common immigration policies, particularly the CEAS.14 This notion of solidarity is now 
referred to as ‘flexible’ or ‘effective’ solidarity, following a Joint Statement by the four 
Visegrad countries at an informal meeting of the 27 Member States on 16 September 2016 in 
Bratislava. The Joint Statement enounces that a common migration policy should be based on 
flexible solidarity enabling ‘Member States to decide on specific forms of contribution taking 
into account their experience and potential’.15 The Commission itself, in a somewhat volte-
face, has distanced itself from a supranational notion of solidarity, and embraced the 
intergovernmental notion as Commission President Juncker declared in his 2016 State of the 
Union Speech, that ‘solidarity must be given voluntary. It must come from the heart. It cannot 
be forced’.16 Such an understanding of solidarity, in the current political climate, translates into 
11 Draft Article 18(5) Commission Proposal on a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European Border on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, 
Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final.  
12 P. De Bruycker, ‘Solidarity as a sovereignty-reducing penalty for failing to meet responsibility in the 
European Border and Coast Guard’ Searching for Solidarity in EU Asylum and Border Policies (2015), 
http://odysseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Searching-for-Solidarity-Short-Papers.pdf; S. Peers, 
‘The Reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at Refugees’ expenses’ EU Law Analysis (2015), 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/12/the-reform-of-frontex-saving-schengen.html; H. Rosenfeldt, ‘The 
European Border and Coast Guard in Need of Solidarity: Reflections on the Scope and Limits of Article 80 
TFEU’ in V. Mitsilegas, V. Moreno-Lax V and N. Vavoula (eds.), Securitising Asylum: Extraterritoriality and 
Human Rights Challenges (Brill, 2017, forthcoming). 
13 D. Thym, 53 CMLR (2016) p. 1545, p. 1555 et seq.  
14 On the incentives for Member States to agree solidarity measures see D. Vanhelule, J. van Selm and C. 
Boswell, Study for the European Parliament, PE453.167 (2011). 
15 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-the-160919 
16 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/state-union-2016_en 
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focusing the EU’s strategy in response to the refugee crisis on strengthening EU external border 
controls and externalizing refugee protection and migration management through cooperation 
with third countries.   
A third, more identity-driven, notion of solidarity has also emerged. This notion 
advocates a less state-centred, less securitised and less exclusionary understanding of solidarity 
by requiring greater focus on the individual.17 The inclusion of a rights-based approach 
dimension into solidarity is seen as required by the EU fundamental rights protection 
framework.18 This understanding of solidarity advocates, for example, the introduction of 
secondary free movement rights for refugees in the EU.19 It has also found expression in calls 
by the European Parliament for a more holistic response to the refugee crisis which should 
include elements of ‘external’ solidarity in the form for example of humanitarian visas.20  
 
2. INDIVIDUAL-FOCUSED SOLIDARITY IN VISA POLICY 
 
Visa policy is a field where individual-focused solidarity, in the form, for example, of a system 
of EU humanitarian visas, is entirely absent. This is a consequence of the division of 
competence on visas between the EU and the Member States, the unclear scope of the 
fundamental rights protection framework applicable to visas in general, and the lack of political 
readiness.   
17 V. Mitzilegas, ‘Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System’, 2 Comparative Migration 
Studies (2014) p. 181-202, p. 186. See also the contribution of V. Mitsilegas in this issue.  
18 M. Bell, ‘Irregular Migrants: Beyond the Limits of Solidarity’ in M. Ross and Y. Borgmann-Prebil (eds.), 
Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 151-165; F. Maiani, Hotspots 
and Relocation Schemes: The right therapy for the Common European Asylum System?’ EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy (2016), http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hotspots-and-relocation-schemes-the-right-
therapy-for-the-common-european-asylum-system/. 
19 V. Mitzilegas, ‘Solidarity and Mutual Recognition: Lessons from European Criminal Justice Cooperation’ 
Odysseus Network’s First Annual Policy Conference, 26-27 February 2016; F. Maiani, The Reform of the 
Dublin III Regulation, Study for the European Parliament PE571.360 (2016), p. 56; J. Bast, 22 EPL (2016), p. 
289, p. 301-302. 
20 European Parliament non-binding Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the 
need for a holistic EU approach to migration, 2015/2095 (INI).  
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Indeed, while it is widely recognised that state discretion to control entry into state 
territory is limited by human rights obligations, as clearly reflected in provisions of EU external 
border control instruments, the applicability of such obligations to extra-territorial settings, 
such as visa issuing in third countries, is highly contested, although certainly not excluded 
altogether.21 In particular, it is generally submitted by commentators that Article 3 ECHR 
requires Contracting States to grant visas through their diplomatic representations to applicants 
in specific circumstances, particularly as the ECtHR has identified as instances of extra-
territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State covered by the ECHR ‘cases involving the 
activities of its diplomatic and consular agents abroad’.22 However, the question remains 
ultimately unanswered and may be further complicated in practice by trends such as extensive 
reliance by states on external service providers in the visa issuing process.  
In X and X v Belgium the Court of Justice had the opportunity to clarify the scope of 
the common visa policy and the consequent application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
whose implementation, unlike Article 3 ECHR, does not depend on the exercise of jurisdiction 
but indeed on the application of EU law.23  The Court, departing from the opinion of the 
Advocate General, held that the Charter of Fundamental Rights, with particular reference to 
21 Articles 4 and 14(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code), [2016] OJ L 77/1 (hereafter Schengen Borders Code); G. Noll, ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right 
to Entry under International Law?’ 17 International Journal of Refugee Law (2005) p. 542-573;G. Goodwin-
Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 244-
252;E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement’ in E. 
Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 89-177, p. 109-128; J. C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 160-171; M. den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Hart, 2012), p. 120-
141; V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen Visas and 
Carriers’ Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide International Protection’ 10 European 
Journal of Migration and Law (2008), p. 315-364.   
22 ECtHR, Bankovich v Belgium, Judgement of 12 December 2001, Application No. 52207/99, para. 73; ECHR, 
WM v Denmark, Decision of 14 October 1992, Application No. 17392/90, para 1; ECtHR, Al-Skeini v UK, 
Judgement of 7 July 2011, Application No. 55721/07, para. 134; ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, Judgement of 23 
February 2012, Application No. 27765/09, para 75; ECtHR, Medvedyev v France, Judgement of 29 March 2010, 
Application No. 3394/03, para 65. Disagreement exists in relation to the applicability of Article 33(1) 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 25 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, amended by the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (hereafter 1951 Refugee Convention), ibid.  
23 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium; Article 51 Charter of Fundamental Rights; Case C-617/10 Åklagaren 
v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para. 19. 
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Articles 4 and 18, is inapplicable in relation to applications submitted to the Member States’ 
representations for humanitarian visas with a view to seeking asylum in a Member State. 
According to the Court, although such applications are formally submitted under Article 25 of 
the Visa Code on limited territorial validity visas, which are visas that can be issued by the 
Member States when the conditions for issuing uniform visas are not satisfied, and are valid 
solely for their individual territories, they are outside the scope of the Visa Code.24 That is the 
case since the Code, in accordance with its legal basis, is solely concerned with visas issued 
for ‘intended stays … not exceeding 90 days in any 180-day period’.25  
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that a contrary conclusion would undermine the 
system established by the Dublin III Regulation by allowing third country nationals to choose 
the Member State in which to submit their asylum application, and would contradict the 
Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin III Regulation by requiring Member States de 
facto to allow third country nationals to submit applications for international protection to the 
representations of the Member States in third countries.26 These supplementing arguments have 
been criticised as unsound and revealing of the existence of political considerations behind the 
judgement.27 The Court’s central argument, on the other hand, appears technically convincing, 
but not necessarily unavoidable. In particular, the Court skilfully highlighted the distinction 
between the purpose of a visa application, which may take it outside the scope of the Visa 
Code, and the implementation of the grounds for refusing a uniform visa (including the 
existence of doubts as to the applicant’s intention to leave the relevant Member State before 
the expiry of the visa) which does not have that effect.28  
24 Ibid., para 43-45; Article 1(1).   
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., para 48-49; Directive 2013/32/EU on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International 
Protection (Recast), [2013] OJ L 180/60 (hereafter Asylum Procedures Directive). 
27 F. Spinelli, ‘Humanitarian visas, still an open question’, Osservatorio Balcani & Caucaso Transeuropa 
(2017), https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Europe/Humanitarian-Visas-still-an-open-question-178723.  
28 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium, para. 46-47.  
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Nevertheless, the position that limited territorial validity visas under the Visa Code can 
be issued only for intended stays of 90 days in any 180-day period could have possibly been 
avoided by emphasising their nature of derogation. The Visa Code does indeed contain rules 
whereby visas can be exceptionally issued or modified in certain circumstances with the effect 
of extending the holder’s stay beyond 90 days in a 180-day period.29  The effect of the Court’s 
judgment is to leave the issue of humanitarian visas to the Member State, and the question of 
the applicability of Article 3 ECHR ultimately to the ECtHR. The judgement has therefore also 
repercussions on the negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council on the 
proposal for a recast Visa Code, which have been suspended following disagreement between 
the two institutions on the very issue of humanitarian visas.30  
The European Parliament has pushed for the inclusion in the recast Visa Code of 
provisions on humanitarian visas as part of a holistic approach to the refugee crisis which 
includes the creation of legal pathways to Europe and elements of ‘external’ solidarity. On the 
other hand, the Commission and the Council have consistently excluded the possibility of 
introducing such provisions in the Code.31 On the contrary, the proposal for a recast Visa Code 
contains provisions which would make it more difficult in practice for third country nationals 
to lodge limited territorial validity visa applications with the Member States on humanitarian 
grounds when they do not fulfil the common conditions for obtaining uniform visas.32 X and X 
29 Articles 25(1)(b) and 33 Visa Code. Cf. Commission Explanatory Memorandum on Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a touring visa and amending the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 562/2006 and (EC) No 767/2008, COM(2014) 
163 final, p. 4-5. 
30 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa 
Code) (recast), COM(2014) 164 final (hereafter proposal for a recast Visa Code); Presidency, Proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union Code on visas (Visa Code) (recast) (first 
reading), 14213/16.   
31 D. Neville and A. Rigon, ‘Towards an EU humanitarian visa scheme?’, European Parliament Briefing 
PE556.950 (2016), p. 3-4. 
32 These provisions relate to the use of external service providers and the deletion of the obligation for the 
Member States to grant the possibility to visa applicants to lodge their application directly with the consulate. 
See U. I. Jensen, Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation, Study for the European Parliament PE509.986 
(2014).  
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v Belgium identifies Article 79(2)(a) TFEU as the appropriate legal basis for EU legislation in 
this field.33 It is unlikely that any EU system will be established. Although some Member States 
have been granting humanitarian visas (in the very form of limited territorial validity visas), on 
a strictly discretionary basis, and as a result of privately driven initiatives, it is evident that 
there is little appetite for the establishment of EU humanitarian corridors.34 The judgement 
therefore, by sealing off visa policy from the issue of humanitarian visas, is not conducive to 
strengthening human rights protection at EU level and recalibrating the EU response to the 
refugee crisis towards a more human-rights oriented approach.   
While individual-centred solidarity seems consequently absent from visa policy, it 
remains true that the policy, since communitarisation, has been increasingly characterised by a 
rights-based approach, in the form of a right of appeal for visa refusal, exhaustive grounds for 
visa refusal, and increasingly clearer and less discretionary rules.35 However, visa policy 
remains primarily a security and foreign policy instrument, characterized by weaker human 
rights constraints than the CEAS and the EU external border control policy.36  In the context 
of inter-state solidarity, the ‘burden’ attached to visa policy is of a different and perhaps less 
onerous nature than that which characterizes the CEAS, given the resources involved in the 
reception and integration of refugees, or the EU external border control policy, given its 
operational aspects often involving the rescuing and reception of irregular migrants. On its part, 
visa policy, as a policy which straddles the sovereignty sensitive areas of internal security and 
33 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium, para. 44.  
34 Vatican Insider Staff, ‘Sant’Egidio: Humanitarian corridors open for one thousand people’, La Stampa 
(2015); Commission Ninth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2017) 74 final. For progress on the 
proposal for a Regulation establishing a Union resettlement Framework, see Presidency, Reform of the 
Common European Asylum System and Resettlement, Council doc. 6851/17.  
35 A. Meloni, ‘Visa Code Regulation (EC) N. 810/2009’, in K. Hailbronner and D. Thym (eds.), EU immigration 
and Asylum Law – A Commentary (2nd edition, CH Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2016); Case C-84/12, Koushkaki, 
EU:C:2013:862; Case C-403/16 El-Hassani, pending, on whether the right of appeal in the Visa Code requires 
appeals to be heard by a court of law; proposal for a recast Visa Code; draft compromise text for trialogue 
negotiations, Council doc. 7714/16. 
36 Cf. Article 32 Visa Code with Articles 4 and 14 Schengen Borders Code. See also Article 3 Asylum 
Procedures Directive; Article 3(1) Dublin III Regulation.  
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foreign policy, is characterised by specific difficulties and particularities. Solidarity between 
the Member States has proved key in two fields in particular: legal harmonization which has 
required political solidarity between the Member State vis-à-vis third countries, and on-the-
ground implementation, where solidarity has been necessary to ensure burden-sharing, 
consistency and effectiveness.37  
 
3. SUPRANATIONAL SOLIDARITY VIS-À-VIS THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
The common visa policy necessarily involves the harmonization of the Member States 
positions vis-à-vis third countries. This is most evident in relation to the establishment of 
common ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists of, respectively, third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas  when crossing the external borders of the Member States, and third 
countries whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, which are contained in the Visa 
Regulation.38 Harmonization has been a long and difficult process: firstly because of the wide 
divergences in the Member States’ original national visa policies due to their different links 
with third countries, and secondly because of the need to ensure reciprocity, i.e. that the 
Member States are reciprocated from third countries to which they grant visa-free treatment as 
a result of EU harmonization. The Member States’ political commitment to the project of 
European integration, and the application of the Community method in the field of visas, 
including the requirement of qualified majority voting, have facilitated the harmonization 
process. It has nevertheless been necessary to introduce a number of mechanisms to overcome 
cases where there is little convergence of interests among the Member States, particularly given 
37 M. Wesseling and J. Boniface, ‘New Trends in European Consular Services: Visa Policy in the EU 
Neighbourhood’ in J. Melissen and A. M. Fernández (eds.), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2011), p. 115-141, p. 121.  
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement [2001] OJ L 81/1, as amended (hereafter the Visa Regulation).  
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the sovereignty sensitive nature of visas. These mechanisms have taken various forms, such as 
visa facilitation agreements between the EU and third countries, arrangements for local border 
traffic between individual Member States and third countries, the process of conditional visa 
liberalisation adopted for certain third countries together with the safeguard clause in the Visa 
Regulation, and the reciprocity clause in the same Regulation.  
 
3.1 HARMONIZATION AND CONDITIONALITY 
 
The criteria for the establishment of the ‘black’ and ‘white’ visa lists in the Visa Regulation 
have driven the process of harmonization and solidarity. These criteria have undergone 
significant development over time. The original Visa Regulation adopted under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 2001 provided in its Recital 5 that:  
determination of the [black and white] lists is governed by a considered, case-by-case 
assessment of a variety of criteria relating inter alia to illegal immigration, public policy 
and security, and the EU’s external relations with third countries, consideration also 
being given to the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity. 
Furthermore, a Declaration on former Article 62(2)(c)EC attached to the EC Treaty provided 
that the Council could take into account the ‘foreign policy consideration of the Union and the 
Member States’ when adopted rules on short-term visas’. 
The Visa Regulation was amended in 2014 whereby it now provides in its Article 1:  
[t]he purpose of this Regulation is to determine the third countries whose nationals are 
subject to, or exempt from, the visa requirement, on the basis of a case-by-case 
assessment of a variety of criteria relating, inter alia, to illegal immigration, public 
policy and security, economic benefit, in particular in terms of tourism and foreign 
trade, and the Union’s external relations with the relevant third countries, including, in 
11 
 
particular, considerations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the 
implications of regional coherence and reciprocity.39  
With regard to their pre-2014 version in particular, the criteria for establishing the common 
‘black’ and ‘white’ lists tended to lead harmonization and solidarity towards an exclusionary 
focus by giving priority to mutual recognition of national restrictive positions in the 
harmonization process, particularly, but not exclusively those based on irregular immigration 
and internal security concerns. The negative effects of the resulting restrictiveness upon some 
Member States were gradually and partially addressed through EU visa facilitation agreements, 
local border traffic regimes between the relevant Member States and third countries, and the 
establishment of common visa application centres in third countries.40 Although prioritising 
national restrictive positions, particularly if based on immigration and security risks, can be 
seen as a consequence of the compensatory nature of visa policy, the policy can at least be 
criticised for not providing a definition of the criteria of ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘security’. 
This may be contrasted with the approach taken by countries such as the US and Canada which 
rely more extensively on numerical benchmarks, although the criteria applied by these 
countries and their measurement can be challenged.41 EU visa liberalisation roadmaps and 
action plans, ‘visa dialogues’ and reports by the Commission on the fulfilment by third 
countries of the criteria in the Visa Regulation clarify the meaning of these criteria, although 
some of these instruments have been criticised as characterised by contradictory requirements, 
39 Regulation (EU) No 509/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, [2014] OJ L 
149/67. 
40 For visa facilitation agreements see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm; Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States 
and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, [2006] OJ L 405/1; Article 41(2) Visa Code; Press 
Release, The first EU ‘Common Visa Application Centre’ opens in Moldova, 25 April 2007, IP/07/561. 
41 Alison Siskin, ‘Visa Waiver Programme’, Congressional Research Service (2015).  
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in terms of the specific measures that third countries are expected to adopt, whose 
implementation is inconsistently and unevenly monitored by the Commission.42   
The 2014 changes to the criteria for establishing the common visa lists reflect how visa 
policy has evolved from a policy which amounted to mutual recognition of national visa 
restrictions, to a common policy reflecting EU interests and objectives, and a continuous 
process of balancing tendencies towards exclusion dictated by internal security objectives, with 
tendencies towards openness.  The new reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms 
is, however, controversial. While the EU is required by the Treaties to foster human rights 
protection in third countries, and visa policy can be seen as a carrot and stick in this context, 
the application of the criterion has the practical effect of further penalising third country 
nationals that are subject to oppressive regimes, and supports the imposition of visas on 
nationals of refugee-producing countries. In this context, a system of ‘target’, or ‘intelligent’ 
visa sanctions against identified individuals under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
could be preferred as more in line with the EU’s proclaimed identity. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the objective of fostering human rights protection in third countries through the use 
of visa policy has also served the EU’s agenda of externalizing asylum protection.  
Generally, the exclusionary focus of the common visa policy has gradually lessened.43 
From 2006 to 2017, 33 countries have gained visa free treatment from the EU.44  There are 
42 See for example the Action Plans and Progress Reports for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-
liberalisation-moldova-ukraine-and-georgia/index_en.htm;  the Roadmap and Progress Reports for Turkey, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm; the EU-Russia 
Common Steps, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20130311_02_en; the 
Commission Report on the fulfilment by Colombia of the relevant criteria in view of the negotiation of a visa 
waiver agreement between the European Union and Colombia, COM(2014) 665 final; S. Kacarska, 
‘Europeanisation through mobility: visa liberalisation and citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 21 (2012). 
43 See for example S. Mananashvili, ‘Access to Europe in a Globalised World: Assessing the EU’s Common 
Visa Policy in the Light of the Stockholm Guidelines’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 74 (2013), p. 1. 
44 These are Bolivia, 22 ACP states, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Moldova, Colombia, Peru, the United Arab Emirates, Georgia and Ukraine, Annex II Visa Regulation. For visa 
facilitation agreements see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/index_en.htm.  
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proposals for extending such treatment to Kosovo and eventually Turkey, in the context of the 
EU-Turkey Statement, and informal talks have been opened with South Africa.45  This change 
has been facilitated, with regard to candidate and Eastern Partnership countries, by the 
application of a conditional visa liberalisation process implemented through the visa 
liberalisation roadmaps and action plans mentioned above. Under this process, in order to 
obtain visa free treatment from the EU the relevant third countries had/have to meet EU’s 
demands including on: readmission, security of travel documents, reduction in irregular border 
crossings, alignment of border control and visa policies to those of the EU, and protection of 
fundamental rights, including the introduction of an effective national asylum system in line 
with the 1951 Refugee Convention, protection of minority rights and protection of freedom of 
expression.  
This conditionality process, overseen by the Commission, is ultimately enforced 
through the ‘safeguard’ clause/‘visa waiver suspension’ mechanism which was originally 
inserted in the Visa Regulation in 2013. The safeguard clause was recently amended, to make 
recourse to its use by the Member States easier, with a view to achieving Member States’ 
agreement on visa liberalization towards Georgia and Ukraine.46 In this context, the visa 
liberalisation process and the safeguard clause have been instrumental in achieving greater 
political solidarity between the Member States towards openness and fulfilling the EU’s 
objective of close association with the third countries concerned through enhanced mobility.  
At the same time, the visa liberalisation process has been an expression of the EU’s wider 
strategy to externalise international protection and migration management through cooperation 
45 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo), COM(2016) 277 final; 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Turkey), COM(2016) 279 final. 
46 Article 1a Visa Regulation.  
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with neighbouring countries of origin and transit of migrants, which is secured through EU 
concessions. This strategy is questionable from the point of view of human rights compliance 
by the EU, given that serious doubts exist as to capacities of certain third countries to offer 
adequate reception and protection.  
  The extent to which the visa liberalisation process applied to candidate and Eastern 
Partnership countries will be replicated in relation to third countries of origin and transit of 
migrants included in the Partnership Framework on Migration launched by the Commission 
remains, however, doubtful.47 The Commission has expressed the position that the credibility 
and effectiveness of the Partnership depends on EU policies, such as visa policy, offering other 
sources of leverage and support alongside financial assistance, and has identified visa policy 
in particular as a very powerful element in the discussion with third countries about cooperation 
on migration.48 However, for the moment the Partnership envisages only a visa facilitation 
agreement (accompanied by a readmission agreement) with Jordan.49 This may be seen as a 
reflection of the fact that, unlike for candidate and Eastern Partnership countries, an EU 
commitment to close association with the countries of the Partnership is inexistent, or very 
tenuous. On a cost-benefit assessment, the Member States may be prepared to grant visa 
facilitation at the most, which has proven not to be a strong enough incentive in some cases.50   
 
47 Commission Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the 
European Agenda on Migration COM(2016) 385 final.   
48 Commission Second Progress Report: First deliverables on the Partnership Framework with third countries 
under the European Agenda on Migration COM(2016) 360 final, para 3.3, p. 13; Commission Third Progress 
Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration 
COM(2017) 205 final, para. 4, p. 16; Commission Communication, COM(2016) 385 final, p. 8.  
49 Commission Second Progress Report, COM(2016) 360 final, p. 9.  
50 Council Conclusions on enhancing return and readmission of illegally staying third country nationals, Council 
doc. 10112/17; S. Carrera et al., ‘EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A model 
to follow?’ CEPS Paper 87 (2016), p. 5-7. Amendments by the Council to the proposal for a recast Visa Code 
envisage the introduction of a list of third countries which cooperate with the EU on readmission and whose 
nationals accordingly benefit from a set of visa facilitations when they meet specific requirements relating to 
their ‘bona fide’ traveller status, draft Article 13(2a) Compromise text for trialogue negotiations, Council doc. 
7714/16. 
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3.2 THE RECIPROCITY CLAUSE 
 
The reciprocity criterion and clause in the Visa Regulation, according to which a third country 
whose nationals are visa exempt by the EU is required to reciprocate such a treatment to 
nationals of all EU Member States, rest on solidarity between the Member States based on 
reciprocity, their self-interest in the EU’s ability to present a unified front and exert leverage 
externally, and the EU principle of equal treatment of EU nationals.51  Notwithstanding the 
reciprocity criterion and clause, full reciprocity between the third countries in the ‘white’ list, 
and the Member States, has not been fully achieved. The number of cases of non-reciprocity 
rose sharply with the accession of new Member States following the 2004, and 2007 EU 
enlargements. Since then, the situation has improved significantly, and currently non-
reciprocity is limited to Canada, in relation to nationals of Bulgaria and Romania, and the US, 
in relation to nationals of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Cyprus and Croatia.52 The EU has also 
been active in concluding visa waiver agreements with the third countries in the ‘white’ list 
which replace agreements by the Member States.  
Cases of non-reciprocity between the Member States and third countries, particularly 
the US and Canada, have proved a test for EU solidarity. The US and Canada, whose visa 
policies are interrelated, impose (or used to, in some cases) visa requirements on nationals of 
some Member States. They justify this primarily on the ground that these Member States do 
not meet the visa refusal threshold laid down in US legislation and Canadian policy, as well as 
other requirements relating to reporting to the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents 
Database, and to the signature and implementation of the Preventing and Combating Serious 
51 Article 1(4) Visa Regulation.  
52 Commission Communication, State of play and the possible ways forward as regards the situation of non-
reciprocity with certain third countries in the area of visa policy, COM(2016) 221 final. Canada has undertaken 
to achieve full reciprocity by 1 December 2017. See Commission Communication, Defining the position of the 
Commission following the European Parliament resolution of 2 March 2017 on obligations of the Commission 
in the field of visa reciprocity and reporting on the progress achieved, COM(2017) 227 final. 
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Crime Agreement.53 The lack of reciprocity with the US and Canada has been a very sensitive 
issue for the affected Member States in terms of domestic politics, and international prestige. 
The difficulties in achieving a positive solution for the affected Member States and the Union 
as a whole are reflected in the various amendments to the reciprocity clause in the Visa 
Regulation. The issue has also spilt over into other areas of EU competence, such as national 
ratification of the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the US, and 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada, as the affected Member 
States and the European Parliament threatened to use their leverage in those contexts.54  
As a result of two sets of amendments to the Visa Regulation, the reciprocity clause has 
been swinging between two different versions: one characterised by automatism, and the other 
characterised by diplomacy. In the original 2001 Visa Regulation, the clause, which was 
inserted on the initiative of the Council, was characterised by automatic reciprocity and 
solidarity, with the effect that third countries in the ‘white’ list that (re)imposed visas on 
nationals of a Member State would be automatically blacklisted.55 It was believed by a number 
of Member States that ‘the advantage of such a clause lay mainly in its dissuasive effect’.56 
Notification of non-reciprocity by affected Member States was however discretionary, and the 
clause was never invoked.57 In 2003, in view of the 2004 enlargement, the Commission started 
a reconsideration of the reciprocity clause resulting in a proposal for amendment.58 According 
to the Commission, the clause had never been invoked by the Member States because of the 
53 Commission Communication, COM(2017) 227 final, p. 4. 
54 Andrew Rettman, ‘Visa dispute to haunt EU-Canada trade pact’, Euobserver (2016), 
https://euobserver.com/foreign/133433; Declaration of the European Parliament of 8 March 2011 on the 
restoration of reciprocity in the visa regime – solidarity with the unequal status of Czech citizens following the 
unilateral introduction of visas by Canada, PE460.335, point B.  
55 Article 1(4) Visa Regulation (unamended).  
56 Visa Working Party, Outcome of Proceedings, Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement, Council doc. 7744/00, p. 3, and Council doc. 8446/00, p. 5. 
57 See Commission Explanatory Memorandum, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
No 539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism, COM(2004) 437 final.  
58 Ibid. 
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serious political repercussions that automatic reciprocity would have for the EU external 
relations. Automatism was assessed by the Commission as the weakness of the reciprocity 
mechanism and as counterproductive.59  
Notwithstanding some disagreement between the Member States during Council 
discussions, the new reciprocity clause adopted in 2005 abandoned automatism for a more 
flexible approach based on diplomacy and political dialogue envisaging a central role for the 
Commission as negotiator, in line with its sole right of initiative. Thus, it contained an 
obligation for the Member States to notify non-reciprocity cases, and gave the Commission 
discretion to propose the introduction of the visa requirement on nationals of the third country 
concerned.60 This was seen by some Member States as weakening solidarity in the common 
visa policy, and the EU’s negotiating position vis-à-vis third countries.61 The Commission, on 
the other hand, defended the approach as the most appropriate and fruitful, as it allowed a 
political assessment of the suitability of retaliation in each case.62 Indeed, cases of non-
reciprocity decreased significantly between 2004 and 2005 as a result of the diplomatic efforts 
of the Commission and the Member States.63  
However, in 2009 a further controversial case of non-reciprocity emerged as Canada 
re-introduced visa requirements for Czech nationals, as a result of a surge in asylum 
59 Ibid. 
60 Article 1(4) Visa Regulation as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as regards the 
reciprocity mechanism, [2005] OJ L 141/3. The new reciprocity clause was accompanied by a Council statement 
stressing that the clause in no way prevented the application of other provisional measures in other fields 
(political, economic and commercial) if advisable as part of a strategy. 
61 Visa Working Party, Outcome of Proceedings, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
No 539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism, Council doc. 11555/04, p. 8-10, and Council doc. 12112/04. 
62 Commission Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2004) 437 final; Commission Explanatory Memorandum, 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM(2011) 290 final. 
63 Commission Report to the Council on visa waiver reciprocity with certain third countries in accordance with 
Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as regards the reciprocity mechanism, 
COM(2006) 3 final, p. 4. 
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applications from Czech nationals of Roma origin since the visa requirement had been lifted 
by Canada in November 2007.64 As a consequence, in 2011 the opportunity was taken in the 
Council, on the initiative of a Member State, to reconsider the reciprocity clause in the context 
of the Commission proposal to amend the Visa Regulation primarily to introduce the 
‘safeguard’ clause referred to above.65 A political compromise was eventually reached 
whereby the new reciprocity clause, which entered into force in early 2014, essentially provides 
for mandatory notification of non-reciprocity cases by the Member States, which is followed 
by negotiations with the third country concerned led by the Commission, with a view to 
achieving reciprocity within a maximum period of two years. At the end of such a period, the 
Commission is to adopt a delegated act for the suspension of the visa exemption which is to 
come into force within 90 days, and which may be blocked by the European Parliament, or the 
Council within a maximum period of 6 months.66  
Twenty one Member States produced a statement, echoing parts of the new clause, 
providing that:  
[t]he amendments concerning reciprocity could have far reaching implications for the 
external relations of the Union and its Member States. We underline that the relevant 
Union institutions are obliged prior to any proposal or decision to extensively scrutinise 
and take into account potential adverse political consequences for the external relations, 
both of the Union and the Member States. This applies in particular to external relations 
64 Commission Sixth report on certain third countries' maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the 
principle of reciprocity, COM(2010) 620 final, p. 6-7. Canada lifted the visa requirement in November 2013. 
65 Commission Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 290 final.  
66 Article 1(4) Visa Regulation as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1289/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 December 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement [2013] OJ L 347/74, whose Article 1(1) and (4) was the subject of an 
unsuccessful annulment action by the Commission based on the ground that the powers they conferred on the 
Commission were not in compliance with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, Case C-88/14, Commission v Parliament 
and Council, EU:C:2015:499.  
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with strategic partners. The Council should ensure that these obligations are carried out 
in full. 67   
Under the new reciprocity clause, the Commission received a number of notifications of non-
reciprocity in 2014.68 While April 2016 marked the deadline for negotiating solutions with the 
relevant third countries, and non-reciprocity continues with the US and Canada, the 
Commission has so far declined to suspend EU visa free treatment for nationals of these 
countries arguing that the suspension would not lead to reciprocity but retaliation with all its 
negative repercussions on EU citizens, the EU’s economy, and its external relations with the 
countries concerned.69 While the Council, although invited by the Commission to express its 
position, has been silent on the issue, the European Parliament has called for the Commission 
to fulfil its legal obligation to act and has threatened a ‘failure to act’ procedure.70  
 Independently of the Commission’s legal obligation to act, the Commission’s stance, 
which it describes as result-oriented and in the ‘common’ interest, can be criticised. The fact 
that the EU is not reciprocated by its strategic partners, and the Commission’s perceived 
inaction in this context have an adverse effect on the EU’s image and credibility, undermine 
the principle of equal treatment of EU citizens and make ‘speaking with one voice’ rhetoric. 
Furthermore, the US insistence in dealing bilaterally with the Member States has raised issues 
with regard to the division of competence between the EU and the Member States in the field 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and, on occasions, has weakened EU 
leverage vis-à-vis the US in relation to data protection issues.71 The solidarity crisis in the 
67 Article 1(4)(d) Visa Regulation.  
68 Commission Report of 22.4.2015 assessing the situation of non-reciprocity with certain third countries in the 
area of visa policy, C(2015) 2575 final, p. 2. 
69 Commission Communication, COM(2016) 221 final, p. 6-9.  
70 Ibid., p. 9; European Parliament resolution on obligations of the Commission in the field of visa reciprocity in 
accordance with Article 1(4) of Regulation 539/2001, 2016/2986(RSP). 
71 Commission Seventh report on certain third countries' maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the 
principle of reciprocity, COM(2012) 681 final, p. 14; P. Hobbing, ‘Tracing terrorists: The EU-Canada 
Agreement and PNR matters’, CEPS Special Report (2008), p. 28.  
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context of reciprocity shows the limitations of the supranational legal method in the absence 
of convergence of interests between the Member States in sovereign sensitive areas.  
 
4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL SOLIDARITY ON THE GROUND: LOCAL 
SCHENGEN COOPERATION AND REPRESENTATION ARRANGEMENTS  
 
The implementation of visa policy remains the responsibility of the Member States through 
their consular authorities. Implementation of the policy raises a number of challenges for the 
Member States requiring solidarity.  
One such challenge relates to consular territorial coverage. Under the Visa Code, 
responsibility for examining a visa application rests with a single Member State. ‘Visa 
shopping’, i.e. multiple applications for visas, is avoided through the Visa Information System 
(VIS) where Member States enter details of visa applications lodged with them.72 The Member 
State normally responsible for examining a visa application is the Member State of the sole or 
main destination of the visa applicant, or if this cannot be determined the Member State of first 
entry.73 Furthermore, under the Visa Code applicants are expected to apply for a visa in their 
country of residence.74 However, the Visa Code does not create any legal obligation for the 
Member States to have a consulate or representation in third countries. Rather, it requires the 
Member States to ‘cooperate’ to prevent situations whereby a visa application cannot be 
considered because the competent Member State is neither present, nor represented in the third 
country or region where the visa applicant resides.75 Similarly, it provides that Member States 
lacking their own consulate in third countries ‘shall endeavour’ to conclude representation 
72 Article 19(2) Visa Code.  
73 Ibid., Article 5. 
74 Articles 5 and 6 Visa Regulation 539/2001. 
75 Ibid., Article 5(4). 
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agreements with Member States that have a consulate there.76  Currently, according to the 
Commission, ‘there are about 900 ‘blank spots’ in the table of consular 
presence/representation, where Member States are neither present nor represented’.77 
According to Hobolth, the average Schengen State ‘has independent visa –issuing consular 
representation in about 50 countries, relies on cooperative agreements in 50 and is not 
represented in 70 states’.78  
A further challenge in the implementation of the policy is consistency in the application 
of the common rules. While the Visa Code has introduced clearer and binding rules, it 
necessarily envisages a certain degree of discretion for the Member States in relation to the 
operational implementation of some of these rules, dictated by the need to adapt the rules to 
local circumstances. In this context, the Visa Code establishes an obligation for the Member 
States’ consulates and the Commission to ‘cooperate within each jurisdiction and assess the 
need’ to establish, inter alia, a harmonized list of supporting documents to be submitted by 
applicants. If such a need is established, the Commission may adopt the relevant measures 
following the examination procedure.79 Furthermore, as reflected in the Visa Code, the 
assessment of the individual position of a visa applicant with a view to determining whether 
there are grounds for visa refusal is necessarily characterised by the exercise of discretion by 
consular authorities.80 In such a scenario, it has been observed that there are large differences 
in the visa issuing practices of EU consulates, ‘with some EU countries clearly demonstrating 
more openness than others’.81  
76 Ibid., Article 8(5). 
77 Commission Staff Working Document, Evaluation of the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of 
the European Parliament and Council establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), SWD(2014) 101 
final, p. 31. 
78 M. Hobolth, ‘European visa cooperation: interest politics and regional imagined communities’, LSE ‘Europe 
in Question’ Discussion Paper 34 (2011), p. 2. 
79 Articles 48 and 5(5) Visa Code.  
80 Ibid., Articles 21(1) and 32(1); Case C-84/12, Koushkaki, para 56. 
81 M. Wesseling and J. Boniface, in J. Melissen and A. M. Fernández (eds.), p. 115, p. 121. 
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Inconsistency in the application of the common rules has a number of negative 
implications. It may lead to consular shopping. While multiple visa applications can be detected 
through the VIS, it is submitted that some visa applicants are prepared to change their travel 
itinerary to be able to lodge their application with the consulate which they consider the most 
accessible in terms of visa issuing practices and geographical proximity.82 In the worst case 
scenario, the inconsistent application of the rules may lead to security deficits undermining the 
effectiveness of and confidence in the common policy with possible spill-over effects on the 
frontier-free Schengen area. Furthermore, inconsistency means the unequal treatment of visa 
applicants and arbitrariness which undermines the EU’s image abroad.83   
Finally, the implementation of visa policy involves significant costs and resources. 
Although, as mentioned above, the Visa Code establishes an expectation, rather than an 
obligation, for the Member States to have a consular presence or representation in all third 
countries or regions of large third countries, when Member States do have a consulate, they 
come under several obligations in relation to staff, premises and security.84 With the 
introduction of the VIS, the Member States are obliged to have in place in their consulates 
costly equipment for collecting biometric identifiers.85 This is in a context where the number 
of visa applications is growing exponentially thus requiring an increase in capacity, although 
there seems to be a large discrepancy in the demands that Member States face.86 Thus, a Local 
Schengen Cooperation Annual Report for China, for example, stated that most Schengen States 
‘do not feel that they currently have the capacity and resources needed to deal with the 
consequences of an introduction of biometrics’.87 
82 Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 101 final, p. 5.   
83 Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the functioning of Local Schengen 
Cooperation during the first two years of implementation of the Visa Code, COM(2012) 648 final, p. 8-9. 
84 Articles 5(4), 8(5), 37 and 38 Visa Code. 
85 Ibid., Article 40(2)(a). 
86 M. Wesseling and J. Boniface, in J. Melissen and A. M. Fernández (eds.), p. 115, p. 121. 
87 General Secretariat of the Council, Note, Local Schengen cooperation between Member States' consulates 
(Article 48(5), first subparagraph, of the Visa Code) - Compilation of summary reports covering the period 
2013-2014, Council doc 12893/14, p. 60 
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Solidarity in response to these challenges has taken mainly two forms: Local Schengen 
Cooperation (LSC) and representation arrangements between Member States. Both are long-
established intergovernmental practices which find a legal basis in the Visa Code.88 EU 
funding, as a further form of solidarity, is available for the setting up and development of 
Common Visa Application Centres (CACs), which are envisaged in the Visa Code, but the 
Member States have scarcely availed themselves of the opportunity, which in the future may 
become available also for full representation.89 
 
4.1 LOCAL SCHENGEN COOPERATION 
 
While LSC was conceived in the 1990s as a relatively marginal and voluntary 
intergovernmental mechanism whose coordination was undertaken by the EU Presidency, it 
has become, under the Visa Code, increasingly structured, with the Commission assuming a 
coordinating role exercised via the EU Delegations.90 The concrete operational tasks that LSC 
is supposed to achieve are a harmonised application of the rules contained in the Visa Code 
taking into consideration local circumstances, and the exchange of information on various 
issues including statistics on visas and migratory and security risks.91 
 In relation to the first task, as mentioned above, the Visa Code establishes only a loose 
framework by requiring that the Member States’ consulates and the Commission ‘shall 
cooperate within each jurisdiction and assess the need to establish’, inter alia, a harmonized list 
of supporting documents to be submitted by visa applicants.92  The Commission has reported 
88 Articles 48 and 8 Visa Code. 
89 Ibid., Articles 40 and 41; S. Mananashvili, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 74 (2013), p. 9; Presidency, Note, 
Council doc. 7320/11, p. 5; Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 101 final, p. 32. 
90 A. M. Fernández, ‘Towards a EU Consular Policy’, in Bátora and Spence (eds.), The European External 
Action Service – European Diplomacy Post Westphalia (Palgrave, 2015), p. 356; Article 48 Visa Code.  
91 Article 48 Visa Code.  
92 Ibid. 
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only limited progress in this regard due to ‘reluctance on the part of Member States at local 
level, seemingly unaware of the legal obligation to carry out this assessment’ and ‘lack of 
awareness by consulate of certain Member States regarding application of a common visa 
policy’.93 In its proposal for a recast Visa Code, the Commission attempts to restrict Member 
States’ discretion to some extent by providing that the list of supporting documents which may 
be requested from visa applicants contained in the Visa Code should be exhaustive, and adopted 
by the Commission under the examination procedure. Furthermore, under the proposal, the 
Member States’ consulate and the Commission ‘shall cooperate within each jurisdiction’ to 
prepare harmonized lists of supporting documents.94  
Apart from these operational tasks, Member States seem increasingly aware of the need 
and advantages of coordinating their positions vis-à-vis third countries on the ground and they 
increasingly expect the EU Delegations to assist them with such coordination. Thus, in China, 
Member States sent ‘one joint answer’ elaborated in consultation with the Commission in 
response to the questionnaires that they received individually from the Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) consular department in relation to their visa policies. Also, with regard 
to China’s refusal to allow Schengen States to open visa centres or rely on mobile visa centres 
in Chinese cities where a Schengen country has neither an embassy or consulate, Member 
States agree to carry out bilateral talks with the MFA ‘but simultaneously want the EU Del to 
keep coordinating and monitoring this issue, not least since there is a risk that Schengen States 
will be played out against each other unless coordination is in place’.95  
 
 
 
93 Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 101 final, p. 12-13; Commission Report, COM(2012) 
648 final, p. 5-6. 
94 Draft Articles 13(4) and (11) and 46.  
95 General Secretariat of the Council, Note, Council doc. 12893/14, p. 61. 
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4.2 CONSULAR REPRESENTATION 
 
Alongside LSC, solidarity in the implementation of visa policy has also taken the form of 
consular representation. Consular representation is a well-established practice between States 
which is regulated by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In the context of 
the EU, it has been practiced by the Benelux and Nordic States. For the purpose of 
implementing visa policy, consular representation has been increasingly relied upon by the 
Member States.96 Representation is regulated by Article 8 of the Visa Code, which, as 
mentioned above, stipulates that Member States lacking their own consulate in a third country 
or region ‘shall endeavour to conclude representation arrangements’ with Member States that 
have a consulate there. Under such arrangements, a Member State may agree to represent 
another Member State for the purpose of examining visa applications and issuing visas on 
behalf of that Member State. In cases where the representing Member State contemplates visa 
refusal, it should transfer the relevant application to the represented Member State which will 
take the final decision, unless the representation arrangement stipulates that representation also 
covers visa refusals. It is also possible for the represented Member State to require prior 
consultation in relation to applications from certain categories of third country nationals. 
Representation is the main response of the Member States to the issue of lack of consular 
coverage. Since 2003, representation has also occurred in cases where a Member State is 
already present in a third country, to improve efficiency, save costs and achieve greater 
consistency in visa issuing.97  
The Visa Code also envisages other forms of cooperation to ensure consular coverage 
for the sole purpose of collecting visa applications and biometric data. These take the form of 
96 M. Hobolth, LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper 34 (2011), p. 2.   
97 See Council, Initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council Decision amending  
point 1.2 of Part II of the Common Consular Instructions and drawing up a new Annex thereto, Council doc 
14701/03. 
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limited representation (exclusively for such purposes), co-location, and CACs.98 The 
establishment of CACs was on several occasions promoted by the European Council, which 
also envisaged the possibility of a role for the EU Delegations.99 However, in practice, this 
form of cooperation is hardly used by the Member States notwithstanding the availability of 
significant EU funding.100 Although there have been examples of successful Common 
Application Centres such as those in Kinshasa, Praia and Chisinau, according to the 
Commission, ‘practice shows that it is much easier to have another Member State to carry out 
the entire procedure (full representation)’.101 Even in those cases where CACs provide 
arrangements for the full visa procedure to be carried out, such as in Chisinau, thus avoiding 
the costs and difficulties relating to sending applications to other places, consular 
representation may not be permanent for all participating Member States, with consuls of some 
Member States present only occasionally.102 For the specific purpose of collecting applications 
and biometrics, the Member States have rather relied on private companies as a solution to 
limited resources and increasing numbers of applications, although the Visa Code currently 
treats cooperation with external service providers as a last resort measure.103  
In light of this reality, the draft proposed recast Visa Code agreed in the Council would 
introduce a number of changes. Firstly, it would introduce some limited degree of ‘mandatory’ 
representation, by amending the rules on the allocation of responsibility among the Member 
States for examining and deciding on applications. Thus, in cases where a visa applicant intends 
to stay in more than one Member State, if the Member State of main destination or of first 
entry, which would normally be responsible for examining the visa application, is neither 
98 Article 40 Visa Code. 
99 See for example European Council, The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting citizens, [2010] OJ C 115, point 5.2. 
100 Presidency, Note, Council doc. 7320/11, p. 5; S. Mananashvili, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 74 (2013), p. 10. 
101 Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 101 final, p. 32. 
102 M. Wesseling and J. Boniface, in J. Melissen and A. M. Fernández (eds.), p. 115, p. 130; S. Mananashvili, 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 74 (2013), p. 10. 
103 Article 17(5).  
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present nor represented, the visa applicant is entitled to lodge his application at the consulate 
of one of the Member State of destination, in order of planned travel itinerary. This is more 
restrictive than the Commission’s original proposal which provided for the possibility, as a last 
resort, of a visa applicant lodging his application at the consulate of any Member State present 
in the relevant third country. Such extensive mandatory representation was however 
unacceptable to the Member States which prefer to rely on bilateral arrangements.104 It was 
also opposed on the ground that it would ‘entail an unequal burdening in staff and costs on 
certain Member States that have a broader consular network’. Some Member States also feared 
that such flexibility could lead to abuses and visa shopping by applicants, and wanted to clarify 
how the Dublin III Regulation would apply in this context.105  
Secondly, the proposed recast Visa Code amends the provisions on representation 
arrangements to support the sole responsibility of the representing Member State for the full 
visa processing. Thus, the current possibility of the represented Member State requiring prior 
consultation for certain categories of visa applicants and the current default option whereby 
negative decisions are normally taken by the represented Member State are removed as 
‘inconsistent with a common visa policy’ in an attempt to strengthen representation.106  
Finally, cooperation with external service providers for the purpose of collecting applications 
and biometrics is no longer a last resort measure and when such cooperation takes place, 
Member States would no longer be obliged to maintain the possibility for visa applicants to 
lodge their application directly at their consulates.107 This proposed change has been criticised 
104 Visa Working Party, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code) (recast), Council doc. 15130/15, p. 12. 
105 Visa Working Party, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code) (recast), Council doc. 12046/14, p. 10. Article 12(2) Dublin 
III Regulation establishes that it is the represented and not the representing Member State which will be 
responsible for examining the asylum claim of the visa holder. 
106 Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 101 final, p. 31. The proposal for a recast Visa Code, 
deletes current Article 23(4)(d). 
107 Draft Article 38(3) and deletion of Article 17(5) proposal for a recast Visa Code.  
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as making it harder for individuals to reach the Member States’ consulates for the purpose of 
lodging an application for a humanitarian visa.108  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has attempted to highlight the form that solidarity has taken in the context of visa 
policy. Although visa policy has increasingly been characterised by a rights-based approach, 
and the Commission has strived to make it more user oriented and friendly, individual-focused 
solidarity may be considered as absent from the policy. This follows conclusively from the 
judgement of the Court of Justice in X and X v Belgium which has had the effect of sealing off 
visa policy from the issue of humanitarian visas, which according to the Court currently fall 
within the competence of the Member States.109 Thus, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
cannot create any obligations for the Member States to issue such visas, and the recast Visa 
Code, in light of its legal basis, cannot contain any provisions on them, as it was proposed by 
the European Parliament. Still the issue as to whether Member States have an obligation to 
issue humanitarian visas in certain circumstances as a result of Article 3 ECHR remains open 
and could be a game changer in prompting the Member States to formulate a common stance.  
Solidarity in visa policy remains therefore essentially inter-state and state-centred. It 
has been important both for the formulation, and the implementation of the policy where it has 
taken a supranational and intergovernmental character respectively. The harmonization of the 
policy has been greatly promoted by the Member States’ commitment to the Schengen project 
and the application of the Community method of decision-making. Furthermore, the EU has 
elaborated a number of strategies and mechanisms to accommodate diverging interests of 
108 U. I. Jensen, Study for the European Parliament, PE509.986 (2014). 
109 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v Belgium. 
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openness and restriction and foster solidarity, including a visa liberalisation process towards 
candidate and Eastern Partnership countries accompanied by the safeguard clause in the Visa 
Regulation. Still, this approach has also attracted criticism in relation to human rights 
protection on the ground that it serves the EU’s strategy of externalisation of protection and 
migration management through cooperation with third countries. It remains, however, unlikely 
that the EU will extensively use visa policy in support of such an externalisation strategy in the 
future.    
In the process of policy harmonization, the reciprocity mechanism has proven 
particularly problematic. The continuing lack of reciprocity between some Member States and 
the US and Canada has led to a solidarity crisis in visa policy. There is no agreement, either 
between the Member States or the EU institutions, as to what solidarity should mean in the 
context of reciprocity, essentially as a result of lack of convergence of interests between the 
Member States. The lack of agreement finds reflection in the various amendments to the 
reciprocity clause, its wording and the inter-institutional dispute as to its legal interpretation. 
The Commission pursues an interpretation of solidarity described as result-oriented and in the 
‘common’ interest, where common means majority. The European Parliament pursues a more 
principled approach, which could also be seen in the common interest. If the European 
Parliament proceeds with a failure to act action against the Commission, as it has threatened, 
the hot potato will eventually fall in the hands of the Council acting by qualified majority which 
has so far been silent. If anything, the reciprocity crisis shows the limitations of the 
supranational legal method in the absence of convergence of interests in sovereign sensitive 
areas.  
Solidarity is also key for the effective implementation of the common visa policy on 
the ground. In this context, solidarity remains essentially intergovernmental in nature. It has 
mostly taken the form of LSC and representation agreements between the Member States, 
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which find their legal bases in the Visa Code. It is strongly functionally driven and has been 
progressively informed by EU norms and procedures. Still, Commission attempts to push 
solidarity forward for the sake of effectiveness, in the form for example of a system of 
‘mandatory’ representation have encountered strong opposition from the Member States.   
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